3 some of the most excrutiating, piteous and demeaning features of their subjects' lives, thereby opening them to the salacious, obtuse and moralistic scrutiny of people who were not, and would not have been, trusted with such intimacies when Russell, Wittgenstein and Hart were alive. Thus, he refers to 'the indecency of being exposed to the depths of Russell's misery and the expression of his sexual passions' and asks 'Why does a great philosopher, or a great artist, or a great scientist, forfeit his privacy forever, so that we all get to read his love letters and sneer at his weaknesses? What such people create is always something far finer than they are. It is extracted from a flawed and messy self so that it can float free, detached from the imperfect life that produced it'. [2002 [ , 63, but see Mendus 2008 Or consider recent controversy surrounding torture, and its use by liberal democracies. [Lukes 2006 and Levey 2007; Scarry, 1981 ch. 1; Sussman, 2005] Torture violates its victims' privacy in at least two ways. The first is that it forces its victims to expose their reactions to great pain, fear, desperation and hope, although forcing people to expose themselves in this way -and, particularly, to hostile and unsympathetic observers -is generally considered cruel, contemptuous and demeaning. This helps to explain why the horror of torture -including its invasions of privacy -can be intensified, not alleviated, by the realisation that one has no information to reveal. As Jacobo Timerman explained, ' It sounds absurd to read that my torturers wanted to know the details of an interview they believed Menachem Begin had held in 1976 in Buenos Aires with the Montoneros guerrillas. It's less absurd when you're being tortured to extract an answer to that question. To anyone at all familiar with Begin, such an interview sounds unreal. But it seems quite coherent to someone who believes in the existence of an international Jewish conspiracy prepared to utilize any method to seize world power…For many years, Argentine Nazi ideologues had claimed the existence of a Jewish scheme for seizing Patagonia, the southern zone of the country, and creating the Republic of Andinia'. [Timerrman 1981, 72-3] .
However, torture can violate victims' privacy in a second way: by forcing victims to divulge information about their friends and associates, their beliefs, ideals and fears, and about their knowledge and opinions of events or personalities. It is this aspect of torture which has generated the most controversy in recent years.
The possibility that the information produced by torture might be used to prevent great evils, such as the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, has led some people, such as the philosopher, Steven Lukes, to wonder whether there might be a liberal-democratic justification for torture. [Lukes 2006, 12] It has led others to insist that torture is an inherently unreliable way of eliciting useful information and that therefore the seeming conflict between ethics and politics, motivating ' one fascinating story I had not previously come across: that of HansJoachim Scharff, one of the most successful interrogators of World War Two. The Hollywood Nazi comes dressed in a leather coat and wielding a pistol, pliers, bright lights and burning cigarette ends: he has ways of making you talk. Scharff apparently never used violence. His methods involved 'a combination of language proficiency; relaxed, casual conversation over the course of several weeks if time permitted; and above all other things, empathy'. Did we know about his methods? Yes, we did. After the war Scharff was invited by the US Air Force to lecture about his experiences, and what he taught them should have found its way into the manuals. A number of other interrogation experts agree that non-violent procedures are by far the most effective way of obtaining information. But no one has made a movie about them'. [Simpson 2010, 27-28] Our two examples-of biography, and of torture -remind us that the reason why people's thoughts and feelings are not as accessible to us as we might like is due as much to the obstacles created by law and custom, as to any intrinsic difficulty in discovering such things. For example, if laws did not forbid employers from quizzing female employees about their sex lives, marital status and reproductive plans, employers would be able to learn facts about their employees that they might have been unable to discover simply by looking at them, or by investigating their work experience, interests and abilities. So while it is possible that neuroscience will enable us to reveal things that we would otherwise be unable to learn, we currently have plenty of ways to find out what other people are thinking, and of manipulating or altering their dispositions, beliefs and plans. However, we do not always act upon on these, even when we could, because we conclude that doing so would be immoral, and in some cases morality makes the possible inconceivable.
Most of the time we do not weigh up the pros and cons of rape, theft and murder as a way of achieving our ends, because we have internalised norms which rule these out as means of getting our way. Our best protections of privacy, then, are likely to depend on people sharing the conviction that invasions of privacy are wrong and ought to be prevented and, if necessary, punished by law and custom.
However, the nature and value of privacy are deeply controversial. Indeed, the difficulty of defining a right to privacy is sometimes thought to be a stumbling block to the statutory recognition and protection of privacy in the United Kingdom.
3 So if neuroscience threatens privacy, this is as likely to reflect uncertainty about the value of privacy, as dangers inherent in new sciences and technology.
Conceptual Disagreement About Privacy
Although the philosophical and legal literature on privacy tends to dwell on the difficulty of defining a right to privacy, it is unlikely that privacy is intrinsically more difficult to define than any other complex right or value. The main reasons why it is hard to define privacy -the absence of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which would enable us to agree on what counts as a case of privacy [Allen, 1988 , Decew, 1997 -suggest that the fuzziness of allied concepts, such as liberty and equality, are themselves reasons why the boundaries of privacy are so hard to fix for philosophical and legal purposes. 3 See, for example, this oft-quoted line from the Younger Report on privacy: 'One of the obstacles to the development of a satisfactory law of privacy has been the difficulty of definition'. [Younger 1972, Para 37, p. 10] . The report notes that some people giving evidence before the Committee favoured the legal recognition of a general right to privacy, [para 34, pp. 9 -10] . However, 'this has not been the way in which English law in recent centuries has sought to protect the main democratic rights of citizens. Neither the right of free speech nor the right of assembly is embodied in statute law. Reliance has been placed on the principle that what is not prohibited is permitted and the main emphasis in the field of civil rights has been placed therefore on keeping within acceptable limits, and providing precise definitions of, the restrictions imposed by the civil and criminal law on the individual's freed of action'. The incorporation into British Law of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the Human Rights Act of 1998 has changed this legal situation somewhat, although in practice incorporation had been going on for a while. This explains the difficulty with Judith Thomson's critique of privacy in 'The Right to Privacy' [Thomson, 1984] . I agree with Thomson that it can be useful to disaggregate privacy into its component parts, however, I am not sure that these parts are best described as claims to liberty, private property and 'rights over the person', let alone that rights to this trilogy are any easier to define, or more basic normatively, than the right to privacy itself. For similar worries with Thomson's arguments, see Thomas Scanlon, 1975 For The difficulty of defining privacy, then, is that we are not as clear about the nature and value of allied concepts, such as liberty and equality, as we sometimes think, and no definition of privacy will remove that problem. However, this appears to be no obstacle to philosophical elucidation of concepts like liberty and equality, [Clayton and Williams 2002; Miller, 2006] , which have received a great deal of attention in recent years, and this suggests that our ability to clarify the nature and value of privacy does not depend on our ability to define or sharply to distinguish it from allied concepts. Conversely, our ability to define privacy for philosophical or legal purposes will not alter the fundamental fuzziness of the concept, or resolve controversy about its nature and relationship to other values.
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The word 'privacy' is associated with a variety of rather different things, typically polarised around control of personal space, control of personal information, and control of personal relationships, because privacy sets limits to the way that outsiders can interfere in our lives. Thus, some synonyms for privacy refer to seclusion, to selective access to an area such as a garden, or a house or apartment, and also to its exclusive or selective, rather than inclusive, character. When associated with control of personal information, synonyms for privacy centre on ideas of confidentiality, anonymity, secrecy, limited disclosure and control of access to information -whether factual, artistic, scientific, legal, religious and metaphysical. Finally, when referring to personal relationships, privacy is associated with the intimate, the sexual, the familial and the domestic.
These are rather different things, and though it is fairly easy to see certain practical, historical and psychological associations amongst them, the things 'privacy' refers to are not tightly related from a logical or a normative perspective. For example, private space can foster control of personal information and enhance our ability to define and shape our personal relationships, but it is equally clear that it can prevent us finding out who knows what about us, who has been saying what about us, and who plans to do what to us. In that sense, privacy can inhibit and, even, threaten intimacy, fostering hypocrisy or mistrust rather than frankness, mutual confidence or love. Nor is that all. Within each category, the things to which privacy refers seem only loosely connected to each other, which makes it hard to tell whether there is any logical or conceptual connection between the different elements of privacy, as commonly understood, or if they are just connected by happenstance, custom and convention.
For example, exclusivity may foster seclusion, but is scarcely necessary for ithow necessary it is probably depends on what sort of access one has to secluded public spaces like parks, roads and countryside, as well as to cinemas, museums and other public buildings which can be quite deserted and peaceful.
Confidentiality may protect our anonymity, but people can clearly value the anonymity of a mass demonstration or protest without presupposing, or desiring, that it be confidential. While we sometimes want to confide in others anonymously, the ability to give and keep secrets often depends on a close personal or professional relationship. So the different aspects of privacy as used to refer to control of information are not intimately connected. Nor can anyone who has much experience of the sexual, the domestic or the familial suppose that these all refer to the same thing, even if the one often leads to, and is associated with, the other. Indeed, many aspects of our supposedly intimate relationships are so bound up with complex social conventions and legal requirements that they say less about us and our desires, interests, needs and feelings than about the society we live in, or the needs and desires of others.
Normative Disagreement About Privacy
However, privacy is controversial not simply because it can be difficult to decide what is, or is not, a case of privacy, but because people often disagree about privacy on evaluative grounds as well. For example, while moral philosophers tend to believe that privacy is valuable, and associate its value with the importance of love, care, individuality, and autonomy, feminists tend to see the association of privacy with these things as reasons to fear that privacy threatens the freedom and equality of women. possible to achieve some points of agreement about the nature and value of privacy, although whether these will be sufficient to resolve ethical controversy over the relative importance of people's claims to anonymity, confidentiality and seclusion compared to the quest for scientific understanding, or the development of safe and effective therapies, is another matter.
Privacy, Democracy and Neuroethics
I have argued, thus far, that the main threats to privacy in contemporary societies are less likely to come from developments in neuroscience or genomics, than from the difficulty of securing agreement on the nature and value of privacy.
notice them. He touches them but feels nothing. He exists in and for himself, and though he still may have a family, one can at least say that he has not got a fatherland'. Tocqueville, 1966, 692 ).
These problems are particularly acute in democracies because liberties of conscience, association and expression facilitate the airing of differences and, to some extent, encourage the creation and identification of different beliefs, identities and ideals. So, disagreements about the value of privacy which may not even arise in authoritarian regimes, can and do become the object of political, as well as philosophical, controversy in democracies.
But the problem, as well, is that we do not well understand the point of protecting privacy in societies in which people's political liberties are secure, and in which people do not live in fear of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, religious or racial persecution, the confiscation of their homes and possessions, enslavement, kidnapping and forced labour. Put simply, part of the difficulty we have in deciding how best to respond to the challenges of neuroscience and genomics -or of terrorism, economic depression, environmental catastrophe or political alienation, for that matter -is that we do not know whether privacy is valuable in democratic societies and, if so, how to identify and describe that value.
Our ideas about privacy are, in many ways, relics from a distant past, predating constitutional government, as well as representative democracy. [Boling 1996, ch. 2] Hence, the ideas of individuality, choice, responsibility, equality and solidarity which they presuppose and license are bound up, in all sorts of complex ways, with sexist assumptions about the nature and value of men as opposed to women; of heterosexual, as opposed to homosexual, love and sex; and of ideologies of race and class fundamentally at odds with the idea that most people are capable of governing themselves, and ought to be able to do so.
For example, until the Guardianship Act of 1973, the outcome of Joan Vicker's Private Members' Bill of 1965, women lacked legal guardianship of their children, and this meant that they had to seek the consent of their husbands, even if they were estranged from them, in order to obtain surgery for their children, or to obtain a passport for them. [Cretney, 1998 180-3] So British law rendered otherwise competent adult women incapable of taking moral and legal responsibility for key aspects of their children's wellbeing. Privacy, in other words, was understood in ways that denied women, as parents, freedoms which were taken for granted by men, with deleterious consequences for sexual equality within the family, and outside it.
In order to resolve contemporary controversy about privacy then, we have to concentrate on the value of privacy implicit in, or compatible with, democratic rather than undemocratic forms of government, and cannot assume that current forms of privacy adequately reflect the former. We must therefore consider the different forms that democracy can take, and how best to distinguish democratic from undemocratic government. what is beautiful, true, reasonable or possible which tacitly depend on assumptions about the inherent inferiority of women; the incapacity of poor people to make politically informed judgements and so on. In short, I think we may be able to use democratic principles as a more political version of Habermas' ideal speech situation: in order to give us a normatively compelling standpoint from which to understand and evaluate competing claims of fact and value. However, fully explaining how this might be done, and why, is the subject of another paper.
consequentialism, or between virtue ethics and critical theory, may or may not be relevant to the ways we understand the nature and value of privacy. By contrast, the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of government will be relevant-or should be.
Implications
What practical conclusions, if any, can we draw from these methodological remarks?
1) The secret ballot can help us to understand the value of privacy, because it is unquestionably democratic, and an example of our rights to confidentiality and anonymity. 11 Although a familiar justification for the secret ballot is that it helps to protect people from coercion and intimidation, a moment's thought suggests that this is not its sole justification, important though that undoubtedly is.
Were the secret ballot justified only because it protects us from bribery and intimidation, we would have to suppose that, in their absence, there would be nothing wrong with forcing people to discuss their voting intentions and acts with anyone who asks.
In fact, it was precisely because he believed this that, after much agonising, Mill voted against the secret ballot, on the grounds that by the 1860s voters should have no serious fear of bribery or intimidation, and could be expected to stand up 11 The following paragraphs draw on A. Lever, forthcoming, 2011 to pressure from others. [Mill, 1984; Urbinati, 2002 should be forced to vote openly. That way, others can correct our mistakes and the prospect of being exposed as selfish, insensitive or stupid will promote morally sensitive and considered voting. However, transparency will only improve the quality of voting if there are enough other people willing and able to correct, rather than to ignore or approve, our defects. And, of course, we must assume that people who are immune to information and arguments when they are free not to listen to them will prove willing and able to accept them when forced to do so. So the case for open voting is problematic even if we abstract from problems of coercion and intimidation.
But the most serious problems with open voting lie elsewhere, and highlight the importance of privacy to democratic citizenship. Democratic citizens are entitled to vote whether or not others approve of this, or of their likely voting patterns.
They are entitled to a say in the way that they are governed whether they are rich or poor, well educated or not. By contrast, no one has a right to represent others politically unless they have been selected for the task. So, while democratic legislators may be more vulnerable to intimidation than citizens -as they are relatively few in number, and hold special power and authority qua legislators -it is the former, not the latter, who must vote openly, not secretly. Secret voting for citizens, then, reflects an important democratic idea: that citizens' entitlement to vote does not depend on the approval of others, or on the demonstration of special virtues, attributes or possessions. While democratic rights to freedom of expression and association mean that citizens are free to consult anyone they want, the secret ballot means that they can share in collectively binding decisions without having to bare their souls to anyone who asks. This, I think, is the core reason why the secret ballot is justified, and is justified even if secrecy comes at some cost to the wisdom, transparency and morality of decisions.
There is a second reason, however, why the secret ballot is so important from a democratic perspective which, like the first, connects the value of privacy to membership in a democratic society in ways that can guide neuroethics.
Advocates of open voting assume that public shaming can be used to prevent and punish careless, selfish or ignorant voting. But while it is possible that open voting might, on balance, improve the quality of voting, both public shaming and the threat of public shaming are hard to justify for wrongful voting.
The problem is this: that public shaming is likely to be out of proportion to the harm committed in a given case of careless or immoral voting, and out of proportion to the punishments deemed appropriate in other cases of wrongful action. Public shaming is a blunt instrument, and likely to fall hardest on those who are unpopular, poor, shy and inarticulate, rather than on those who have committed the worst offences. Nor do its punishments usually bear any relationship to the concerns for fairness, rehabilitation and prevention that constrain legal forms of punishment. So, even if it were possible that open voting really would cure careless, prejudiced or ignorant voting, it would fall foul of concerns for fairness and equality. Hence, modern democracies tend to be wary of public shaming as a way to prevent or to punish immorality: for its weight is likely to fall in ways that are morally arbitrary and that make it harder for us to see and treat each other as equals.
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What the secret ballot suggests, then, is that people's claims to privacy depend, in part, on the nature of the powers and responsibilities that they hold, and that citizenship, itself, provides the baseline for determining what constitutes special power and influence over others, and special responsibility to and for them. In evaluating the implications of neuroscience for people's privacy, therefore, it is important to see that protection for privacy can mark our status as citizens as 12 My argument here has been greatly influenced by Jonathan Wolff's 'Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian ethos' [Wolff, 1998] and by Judith Shklar's discussion of the use of exile and ostracism as punishment by the Greeks, and as way of handling the problem posed by exemplary individuals for democratic equality. [Shklar, 1998] . However, for a more positive attitude to shaming see Etzioni, 1999, 58-62. surely as can the right to vote. Hence, the justification for protecting privacy is not purely instrumental -important though the consequences of protecting privacy are to the assignment and justification of legal rights -because protection of privacy helps to constitute our status as citizens, and to mark the rights and duties which define that status.
2) As the secret ballot suggests, people's identities, from a democratic perspective, are not purely personal, but have an important political dimension.
That is, as citizens we are required to see each other as equals, equally entitled to participate in determining the laws that govern us all, and equally entitled to stand for positions of power and responsibility in our society. This is not the same as recognizing our duties to see each other as people capable of suffering and happiness, though Utilitarians are surely right to suppose that morality also requires us to recognize this fact about each other, as about other sentient beings. Nor is our duty to recognize each other's capacities for citizenship the same as the Kantian duty to treat each other as ends, rather than simply as instruments, or obstacles, to our purposes. Morality certainly requires this, too. But these are duties which we would have whatever type of society we live in. By contrast, the duty to treat our fellow citizens as our peerscontroversial though its content can be 13 -is intrinsic to democratic morality and 13 One of the main forms of controversy, here, concerns the extent of socio-economic inequality which is compatible with democratic government -though, of course, it is also controversial how much inequality is consistent with Kantian forms of respect, or Utilitarian efforts to prevent suffering and promote wellbeing. The key point, however, is that there is no reason, a priori, to politics, and we would have no particular obligation to see compatriots this way but for a shared status as citizens.
The content of our claims to confidentiality -and to privacy more generally, thenare partly conventional, and dependent on what threatens, rather than promotes, people's freedom and equality as we best understand them. It depends, in other words, on facts about people's desires, needs, interests and resources, and on the ways that these are likely to conflict. Hence, it is important to realise that people's interests in privacy can, and do, conflict, and that failure to acknowledge the differences in people's interests in privacy lies at the heart of accounts of our rights which claim to treat to treat people as equals while, in fact, favouring some social groups over others.
For example, our conceptions of privacy are almost certain to lead to inequality, given familiar social divisions, if the privacy interests of men are held to represent those of women; the privacy interests of heterosexuals to represent those of homosexuals; the rich, those of the poor; white people, those of black people; and the old those of the young. To ignore social conflict and competition when defining or adjudicating people's claims to is to assume that the protection of privacy has no relevance to social conflict, or to be cruelly indifferent to the relevance it has. [Lever, 2000] suppose that answers to Kantian, Utilitarian and democratic controversies about economic inequality must be the same. Health and Clinical Excellence might be helpful, as well as experience of more participatory forms of governance abroad. [Weale, 2004 and Thomas, 2009; Rawlins, 2009; Fenton, Brice, Chalmers, 2009; Fung, 2004; Lever, 2010] .
Democracy, however, is not just about the procedures used to make decisions, but the values which justify the particular procedures used to secure legitimate outcomes. 15 Unfortunately, there is no simple test of a Millian sort to tell us whether a decision by an otherwise democratic body is, or is not, legitimate.
16 Still, we may be able to make some progress here, too by considering people's claims to self-government. Thus, one of the considerations we should bear in mind when evaluating the legitimacy of decisions which differentially affect the privacy of social groups, is whether the consequences or the rationale of those decisions adequately reflect people's equal interests in determining the rules under which they live.
Thus, while there may be good reasons why sex offenders, for example, require greater supervision by experts on their release from prison than would be true of other prisoners, 17 we cannot assume that their interests in privacy are irretrievably 15 The importance of this point is well brought out in two important papers by Joshua Cohen, ''Pluralism and Proceduralism', [Cohen, 1994] and 'Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy' [Cohen, 2003] . They help to explain why there is no purely procedural account of democracy, or one that exempts us from the need to decide what forms of equality, liberty and reasoned judgement are necessary for democratic legitimacy. 16 In On Liberty John Stuart Mill famously asserted 'one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control', namely: ' that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant'. [Mill, 1869, ch . 1] For the latest in a long line of objections to Mill's principle (though not to other aspects of his wonderful book), see [Wilson, 2010] . This is an unpublished manuscript called 'Paternalism and Health Policy' and is available from the author on request: james-gs.wilson@ucl.ac.uk 17 I am no expert on these matters, so my points here are illustrative and suggestive rather than conclusive. However, it seems important that children and adolescents are not yet as able to protect themselves or to judge adult behaviour as their elders. Hence, concerns about recidivism in the case of some sex offenders may justify greater post-punishment aid and regulation than would be true for thieves, for example, who may have even higher rates of recidivism than sexoffenders. I do not believe this is remotely compatible with efforts, such as Megan's Law, to deprive former sex-offenders of all privacy. However, there is a huge difference between surveillance and regulation by all, and some supervision combined with aid by experts. For good and bad, there are many ways to transform the lives, identities and prospects of people by surgery, as by other means. Apriori, there is no reason to think that surgical forms of change are more threatening or malevolent than the all these exciting things, but our brains in conjunction with a complex concoction of chemicals secreted by our other organs, by oxygen pumped through our blood by our heart, and so on. Brains are thrillingly complicated and important organs, but it seems as misleading to make such grandiloquent claims on their behalf as there was or is to make comparable claims about our DNA. See also Michael S. Gazzaniga, 2006, ch. 10 , and, in particular, his aspirations for a 'brain-based philosophy of life' and his claim that 'consciousness…is uniquely human'-a view which seems to suppose that we know a great deal more about how various non-human animals see themselves and the world around them than we do. Pp. 141-2. For a rather different, but influential, take on the differences between human and animal consciousness see Michel de Montaigne's famous question from 'An Apology for Raymond Sebond': 'When I play with my cat, how do I know that she is not passing time with me, rather than I with her? ' 1987,505. 21 The main worry about brain transplants, (other than the complexities that may make them technically impossible) is that replacing your brain with someone else's will remove access to your memories, your desires, feelings and hopes, even if it does not actually replace them with those of someone else. These are not trivial worries, and were brain transplants possible, we would obviously have to take these seriously. But as impostors and actors show us, and as the weird sensation of reconnecting with one's childhood letters, photos and books may remind us, we can come to 'think like' other people, including our past selves. So transplanting brains may be rather like transplanting faces, in that transplants, if medically justified, would be more like 'becoming ourselves' once more, than turning into someone else. For a fascinating historical account of how one person can recreate themselves as someone else see Natalie Zemon Davis 1984, which was made into an engrossing movie starring Nathalie Baye and Gerard Depardieu.
alternatives, or that we can adequately evaluate the ethical threats posed by the former without considering the latter. As we have seen, the reasons to devalue or ignore privacy are as likely to have philosophical and legal, as medical or scientific, causes. So, reflection on the threats that neuroscience poses for privacy highlight the importance of the humanities and social sciences to neuroethics:
because the ethical significance of glamorous and exciting scientific developments partly depends on what we think about more mundane forms of human change, enhancement and repression.
